Results for 'Pragati R. Mandikal Vasuki'

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  1.  8
    Musicians’ Online Performance during Auditory and Visual Statistical Learning Tasks.Pragati R. Mandikal Vasuki, Mridula Sharma, Ronny K. Ibrahim & Joanne Arciuli - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
  2. Shit Happens.Pete Mandik - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):205-218.
    Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
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  3.  69
    Saptabhaṅgī: The jaina theory of sevenfold predication: A logical analysis.Pragati Jain - 2000 - Philosophy East and West 50 (3):385-399.
    The system of sevenfold predication of the Jainas, while an invaluable tool in expounding the Jaina doctrine of "non-onesidedness" (Anekāntavāda), has also been criticized for being unsystematic and contradictory. In particular, the fourth predication has been suggested to embrace a kind of irrationality. An analysis is provided here that makes clear the logical basis underlying the seven predications. An interpretation is also offered of the problematic fourth predication that renders the system free from contradiction, and it is suggested that this (...)
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  4.  62
    Synthetic neuroethology.Pete Mandik - 2002 - In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: the intersection of philosophy and computing. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 11-29.
    Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are (...)
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  5. Сутність та значення рейтингової оцінки страхових компаній.С.О Смирнов, R. Pavlov & В.М Горьова - 2010 - Економічний Простір: Зб. Наук. Праць 36:100-108.
    Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.
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  6.  81
    Environmental ethics in Buddhism: a virtues approach.Pragati Sahni - 2008 - New York: Routledge.
    This work gives an innovative approach to the subject, which puts forward a distinctly Buddhist environmental ethics that is in harmony with traditional ...
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  7.  9
    Environmental Ethics in Buddhism: A Virtues Approach.Pragati Sahni (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
    _Environmental Ethics in Buddhism_ presents a logical and thorough examination of the metaphysical and ethical dimensions of early Buddhist literature. The author determines the meaning of nature in the early Buddhist context from general Buddhist teachings on dhamma, paticcasamuppada, samsara and the cosmogony of the Agganna Sutta. Consequently, the author shows that early Buddhism can be understood as an environmental virtue ethics. To illustrate this dimension, the Jatakas are used as a source. These are a collection of over five hundred (...)
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  8. Synthetic neuroethology.Pete Mandik - 2002 - In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: the intersection of philosophy and computing. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
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  9.  17
    To investigate the critical risk criteria of business continuity management by using analytical hierarchy process.Pragati Priyadarshinee, Bhaskar B. Gardas, Swati Mishra, Rakesh D. Raut & Balkrishna E. Narkhede - 2018 - International Journal of Management Concepts and Philosophy 11 (1):94.
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  10.  6
    A Systematic Review of Multiple Terminologies for ICT in Government: A Mesh of Concentric and Overlapping Circles.Pragati Rawat - 2020 - Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 40 (1-2):3-14.
    The purpose of the current article is to identify the frequently used terms for the field of study that deals with the information and communication technology usage in the government and explore the difference and relationship, if any, between these terms. This field of study is inundated with old and new terminologies that lack clarity of usage leading to opportunistic usage, confusion, and impacting accumulation of knowledge. A three-stage search was followed to: (1) identify key terms used to refer to (...)
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  11. The philosophy of neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest (...)
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  12. Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.) - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
    2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas.
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  13.  21
    Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain.Daniel Kolak, William Hirstein, Peter Mandik & Jonathan Waskan - 2006 - Routledge.
    Cognitive Science is a major new guide to the central theories and problems in the study of the mind and brain. The authors clearly explain how and why cognitive science aims to understand the brain as a computational system that manipulates representations. They identify the roots of cognitive science in Descartes - who argued that all knowledge of the external world is filtered through some sort of representation - and examine the present-day role of Artificial Intelligence, computing, psychology, linguistics and (...)
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  14. Philosophy meets the neurosciences.William Bechtel, Pete Mandik & Jennifer Mundale - 2001 - In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
  15. On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, or: What is it Like to Think that One Thinks that P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  16. Representational parts.Rick Grush & Pete Mandik - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):389-394.
    In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scientific explanations. We (...)
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  17. Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism.Pete Mandik - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148.
    Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, are (...)
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  18.  13
    D. G. Leahy and the thinking now occurring.Lissa McCullough & Elliot R. Wolfson (eds.) - 2021 - Albany [New York]: State University of New York Press.
    This book offers a critical introduction to the work of American philosopher D. G. Leahy (1937-2014). Leahy's fundamental thinking can be characterized as an absolute creativity in which all creating is 'live' -- a happening occurring now that manifests a supersaturated polyontological actuality that is essentially created by the logic that characterizes it. Leahy leaves behind the categorial presuppositions of modern thought, eclipsing both Cartesian and Hegelian subjectivities and introducing instead an essentially new form of thinking founded in a nondual (...)
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  19.  25
    Book Discussion: Bonnie Honig, Antigone, Interrupted.Keri Walsh, Vasuki Nesiah, Emily Wilson, Stefani Engelstein, Olga Taxidou & Bonnie Honig - 2015 - Philosophy Today 59 (3):555-578.
  20. Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across (...)
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  21. The Philosophy of Neuroscience.Bickle John, Mandik Peter & Anthony Landreth - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  22. Action-oriented representation.Pete Mandik - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 284--305.
    Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one (...)
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  23. Sliders.Pete Mandik - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9):154-163.
    'Sliders' are a speculative introspection-enhancing future technology allowing humans with cybernetic brain implants to precisely and voluntarily modulate moods and other mental states that vary along a one-dimensional scale. Such future humans may, for example, use the Sliders interface to temporarily present a COWARDLY–COURAGEOUS 'slider' in their visual field, and with a mere act of will change their level of courage from a 60 to a 65 on the 100-point scale. The present article discusses the implications of such a technology (...)
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  24. Type-q materialism.Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
    s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
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  25. Qualia, space, and control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
    According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation (...)
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  26. Control Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
    Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of (...)
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  27. The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.Andrew Brook & Pete Mandik - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (1):3-23.
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained (...)
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  28. Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit (...)
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  29. How Philosophy of Mind Can Shape the Future.Susan Schneider & Pete Mandik - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 303-319.
  30. Selective representing and world-making.Pete Mandik & Andy Clark - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):383-395.
    In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing — the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is (...)
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  31. Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.Pete Mandik - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.
    Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop (...)
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  32. Metaphysical Daring as a Posthuman Survival Strategy.Pete Mandik - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):144-157.
    I develop an argument that believing in the survivability of a mind uploading procedure conveys value to its believers that is assessable independently of assessing the truth of the belief. Regardless of whether the first-order metaphysical belief is true, believing it conveys a kind of Darwinian fitness to the believer. Of course, a further question remains of whether having that Darwinian property can be a basis—in a rational sense of being a basis—for one’s holding the belief. I’ll also make some (...)
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  33. This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction.Pete Mandik - 2013 - Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This is Philosophy. In keeping with the mission of the series, This is Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind will be both accessible to the average student and technology oriented, integrating with supplemental online material. Also, while the proposed book will cover all of the topics one would expect in a traditional philosophy of mind course, it will be up to date and cover recent advances that are sadly missing from many competitor volumes. My proposed volume will not be limited to what (...)
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  34. Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior (...)
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  35. The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana.Pete Mandik - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240.
    I argue against a class of philosophical views of color perception, especially insofar as such views posit the existence of color sensations. I argue against the need to posit such nonconceptual mental intermediaries between the stimulus and the eventual conceptualized perceptual judgment. Central to my arguments are considerations of certain color illusions. Such illusions are best explained by reference to high-level, conceptualized knowledge concerning, for example, object identity, likely lighting conditions, and material composition of the distal stimulus. Such explanations obviate (...)
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  36. Conscious-state Anti-realism.Pete Mandik - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited: With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Cham: Springer. pp. 184-197.
    Realism about consciousness conjoins a claim that consciousness exists with a claim that the existence is independent in some interesting sense. Consciousness realism so conceived may thus be opposed by a variety of anti-realisms, distinguished from each other by denying the first, the second, or both of the realist’s defining claims. I argue that Dennett’s view of consciousness is best read as an anti-realism that affirms the existence of consciousness while denying an important independence claim.
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  37. Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks.Pete Mandik - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.
    In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states ofneurons and neural systems to haverepresentational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between thephilosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises foraccounts of representational content that Icall ``the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mentalrepresentation can bear the work requiredwithin in the causal economy of a mind and (...)
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  38.  12
    Synthetic Neuroethology.Pete Mandik - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (1‐2):11-29.
    Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are (...)
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  39. An epistemological theory of consciousness?Pete Mandik - 2008 - In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri.
    This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly (...)
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  40. The neurophilosophy of consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 418--430.
    The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the (...)
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  41. Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
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  42. Objectivity Without Space.Pete Mandik - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
  43. The neurophilosophy of subjectivity.Pete Mandik - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.
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  44.  10
    The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 458–471.
    Neurophilosophical appeals to neuroscience involve explicit and detailed use of contemporary neuroscientific literature. Neurophilosophy is not to be distinguished from other forms of naturalism by the philosophical conclusions that might be reached but by the role that contemporary neuroscience plays in the premises of the arguments for those conclusions. This chapter examines the neurophilosophical theories, and these theories will be useful to look at a small sample of some of the relevant neuroscience. Vision is one of the most important and (...)
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  45. Robot Pain.Pete Mandik - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge. pp. 200-209.
    I have laid out what seem to me to be the most promising arguments on opposing sides of the question of whether what humans regard as the first-person accessible aspects of pain could also be implemented in robots. I have emphasized the ways in which the thought experiments in the respective arguments attempt to marshal hypothetical first- person accessible evidence concerning how one’s own mental life appears to oneself. In the Chinese room argument, a crucial premise involves the thesis that (...)
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  46.  54
    Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Continuum.
    Introduction: What is philosophy of mind? -- The key terms -- The key thinkers -- The key texts.
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  47. The introspectibility of brain states as such.Pete Mandik - 2006 - In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a (...)
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  48. Philosophy of Science.Pete Mandik & William Bechtel - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    00192001 Philosophy of science is primarily concernedto provide accounts of the principles and processes of scientific explanation. Early in the twentieth century, philosophers of science focusedon the logical structure of scientific thought, whereas in the later part of the century logic was de-emphasized in favour of other frameworks for conceptualizing scientific reasoning andexplanation, andan emphasis on historical andsociological factors that shape scientific thinking. While tracing through the landmarks of this history we note many points of contact between the philosophy of (...)
     
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  49. Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
    I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments (...)
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  50. Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.Pete Mandik - 2005 - Endophysics.
    I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci.
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